This proposal seeks validator approval to introduce a net-outflow restriction on the ZIG-to-Ethereum transfer route through Axelar by reducing the permitted 24-hour net outflow of $ZIG from 5% to 0%.
The change is informed by a review of historical network activity following the August 2026 security incident involving PermaPod. It is intended to reduce the risk of significant unauthorised asset outflows through this specific route.
Inbound transfers would remain unaffected by the proposed change, while outbound transfers would remain possible where sufficient inbound capacity exists within the applicable accounting window. Other IBC channels would remain unchanged.
Following the security incident involving PermaPod on 29 August 2026, the Foundation conducted a review of historical IBC activity and the existing transfer limits on the ZIG-to-Ethereum route.
The review covered six months of mainnet activity, with historical transfer data reconciled against onchain module counters. All 36 reconciliation checks matched the recorded onchain data.
The findings showed that the route is predominantly used for inbound transfers:
The two outbound transactions consisted of a transfer of 995 $ZIG on 24 August 2026 and approximately 6.86 million $ZIG associated with the security incident on 29 August 2026.
This activity indicates that the route primarily serves as a mechanism for bringing $ZIG into the network, with very limited historical outbound usage.
Under the existing configuration, the 5% outbound limit permits a substantial amount of $ZIG to leave the network within a 24-hour period. The August 2026 incident demonstrated that a significant unauthorised transfer could occur without exceeding that threshold.
The proposed adjustment would address this exposure by preventing net outflows through the identified route.
Given the limited historical outbound activity, the restriction is expected to have minimal impact on established transfer patterns. However, it would limit legitimate outbound transfers where sufficient inbound capacity is unavailable.
The Foundation considers this a proportionate security measure based on the risks identified and the route’s historical usage.
The proposal introduces the following adjustment to the IBC rate-limit configuration:
| Parameter | Current | Proposed |
|---|---|---|
| Asset | unit-zig (ibc/9BEE…) | Unchanged |
| IBC Channel | Axelar channel-1 | Unchanged |
| max_percent_send | 5% | 0% |
| max_percent_recv | 10% | 10% |
| duration_hours | 24 | 24 |
| Authority | Governance module | Governance module |
The change would prevent net $ZIG outflows through the specified Ethereum route during the applicable 24-hour accounting window.
In practice:
The adjustment would be executed through the governance module in accordance with the network’s established procedures.
No changes to the underlying IBC protocol or unrelated transfer channels are proposed.
The proposed restriction is designed to reduce the risk of significant unauthorised asset movements through the ZIG-to-Ethereum IBC route.
By reducing the permitted net outflow to zero, the proposed change would introduce an additional protocol-level safeguard, preventing transfers or sequences of transfers that would result in a net movement of $ZIG out of the network through this specific route.
This would materially reduce the exposure associated with the transfer pattern identified during the incident.
The measure is specific to this route and should be considered one component of the network's broader security controls. It does not eliminate all risks associated with unauthorised transfers or activity through other channels.
The proposed parameter adjustment would remain in effect unless modified through a subsequent governance decision.
The Foundation recommends reviewing the impact of the restriction after 90 days, taking into account transfer activity, network requirements, security considerations and any material changes in legitimate demand for outbound transfers.
This review would not automatically reverse or modify the restriction. Any proposed adjustment would remain subject to the applicable governance process.
Should network requirements change, validators may consider a subsequent proposal to amend the outbound limit. This approach maintains the security safeguard while allowing the network to reassess its suitability as usage patterns evolve.
This proposal follows ZIG Chain's standard governance process, including the deposit period, community discussion and a 96-hour voting window. No expedited process is proposed.
Eligible ZIG Chain validators may vote on the proposed parameter adjustment through the established stake-weighted governance mechanism.
Voting options:
The proposed adjustment introduces an additional security safeguard for a specific IBC transfer route, informed by six months of historical network activity and the findings of the August 2026 security review.
By limiting net outflows while preserving inbound transfers, the measure is intended to reduce exposure to significant unauthorised asset movements without affecting other IBC channels.
The Foundation believes the proposed change represents a proportionate response to the risks identified and recommends its consideration through the network's established governance process.